Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model

Abstract:

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Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 250-253)

Edited by:

Guangfan Li, Yong Huang and Chaohe Chen

Pages:

2440-2445

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440

Citation:

Z. B. Wu et al., "Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 250-253, pp. 2440-2445, 2011

Online since:

May 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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