Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model

Zhong Bing Wu; Bing Yao; Yi Sheng Liu; Shi Jie Jiang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440

Paper Titles

A Study of Beijing’s Suburban Residential Areas
p.2418

Study on Finite Element Model of Infilled Walls of Steel Frames
p.2424

Durability Research on Masonry Structures of Historical Buildings in Xi’an Beilin Museum
p.2428

Experimental Study on Development Characteristics of Dynamic Pore-Water Pressure of Anti-Filter Material in High Earth-Rock Dam
p.2435

Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model
p.2440

Application of Wavelet Transform to Modal Parameter Identification of the Concrete-Filled Steel Tube Arch Bridge
p.2446

LQG Modal Control on Spatial Structures Using MR Damper
p.2451

Online Identification with Least Square Method for Pseudo-Dynamic Tests
p.2455

Shear Stiffness of Segmental Joints in Cantilever Casting Concrete Bridges
p.2460

HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 250-253Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of...

Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model

Abstract:

Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 250-253)

Pages:

2440-2445

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440

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Online since:

May 2011

Authors:

Zhong Bing Wu, Bing Yao, Yi Sheng Liu, Shi Jie Jiang

Keywords:

Agent-Construction, Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism, Multitask Principal Agent

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References

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