Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model
Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.
Guangfan Li, Yong Huang and Chaohe Chen
Z. B. Wu et al., "Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 250-253, pp. 2440-2445, 2011