The Analysis of Government Re-Regulation Caused by Externality of Building Energy-Saving

Abstract:

In this paper, aiming at the problem of “market failure” in the building energy-saving field, we discuss the principle of externality in this field and analyze how the externality of building energy-saving leads to the rent-seeking behavior of building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers using the economic theory. Based on the Game theory, we analyze the revenue and cost of unproductive activities between building energy-saving regulation department and building energy-saving products manufacturers or developers, how the government supervises and regulates corruption which comes from unproductive activities, and the tripartite game model of the rent-seeking behavior in the domain of energy-saving is built. On the basis of the establishment and solution of the tripartite game model，we put forward effective countermeasures and methods for government re-regulation.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 446-449)
• Pages: 2267-2271
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.446-449.2267
• Online since: January 2012
• Authors: Ting Wang, Qian Li, Hong Liang Ma
• Keywords: External Economic, Government Re-Regulation, Tripartite Game

References

[1] Moncur J.E.T. Drought Episodes Mangement[M].Water Resource Bulletin. 1989.

[2] George Stigler. The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics (Spring)[J]. 1971.

[3] Wang xingyu, Xue laiyi,"The tripartite game model analysis of rent-seeking theories," Research on Financial and Economic Issues, November (2001)

[4] George Stigler, Claire Friedland. What can the Regulators Regulate: The Case of Electricity[J]. Journal of Law and Economics1. 1962.

[5] Xu hongbing, "Market failure, government failure and Countermeasures," Journal of zhengzhou university (philosophy and social sciences), July 2003.