Study on Rewards and Punishments Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain with Random Collection

Abstract:

Based on the energy recycle ideas, in view of the three-level green supply chain (GSC) including a manufacturer, a processor and a collector, the manufacturer-leading Stackelberg models were established with random recycling. The rewards and punishments contract between the manufacturer and the processor was designed, and the influences of the proposed mechanism to the game parties’ optimal strategies were discussed. The research shows that implementation of the rewards and punishments mechanism is effective to improve the effort-level for recycling end of life (EOL) product, and increase the processing rate of EOL product. The conclusions are helpful to guide the formulation and implementation of the strategy of sustainable development in China nowadays. In addition, the research has great realistic significance for instilling the consciousness of environmental protection.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 518-523)
• Pages: 3512-3517
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.518-523.3512
• Online since: May 2012
• Authors: Jian Cao, Qiang Hu, Ting Yuan Lou
• Keywords: Energy Cycle, Green Supply Chain, Random Recycling, Remanufacturing, Utilization Rate

References

[1] W.B. Wang, Q.L. Da: Study on premium and penalty mechanisms for the electronic product reverse supply chain considering the leading to government. Chinese Journal of Management Science, Vol. 18 (2010), p.62.

[2] L.Y. Sun, B. Wang: State-of-the-art in reverse logistics researches. China Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 16 (2005), p.928.

[3] D. Hammond, P. Beullens: Closed -loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 183 (2007), p.895.

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.033

[4] D. Xiao, P.Q. Huang: Incentive mechanism of closed loop supply chain based on asymmetric information. Industrial Engineering and Management, Vol. 12 (2007), p.11.

[5] Q.L. Gu, Q.S. Chen: Optimal contract of the manufacturer in reverse supply chain with incomplete information. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, Vol. 13 (2007), p.596.

[6] H. Sun, Q.L. Da: Pricing and coordination for the reverse supply chain with random collection quantity and capacity constraints. Journal of Systems Engineering, Vol. 23 (2008), p.720.

[7] X. Li, Y.J. Li, X.Q. Cai: Reverse supply chain coordination considering collection with stochastic quantity. Journal of Systems Engineering, Vol. 23 (2008), p.713.

[8] N.N. Yan, X.Y. Huang: Models of closed-loop supply chain with third-party reverse logistics and their applications. Journal of Management Sciences in China, Vol. 11 (2008), p.83.

[9] H. Emmons, S.M. Gilbert: Note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods. Management Science, Vol. 44 (1998), p.276.

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276

[10] R.C. Savaskan, S. Bhattacharya, L.N.V. Wassenhove: Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing. Management Science, Vol. 50 (2004), p.239.

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0186