Adaptation to the International Pollutant Control in Dynamic Framework

Abstract:

Most analysis of global warming are seldom analyses the countries adaptability to the climate change but may have an impact on the strategy of tackling global worming. Even if considered the influence, just works with the simple static model and not the dynamic model to analyze. This study is considering adaptation that is crucial for the analysis of the pollutant control problems in the dynamic framework. We show that the optimal trajectory and stock in the global optimality and Nash equilibrium respectively.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volume 739)
• Pages: 361-364
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.739.361
• Online since: August 2013
• Authors: Xian Jiao Lv, Xiao Yan Zou
• Keywords: Adaptation, Dynamic Analysis, Pollutant Control

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