R&D Model of Platform Technology for Digital Content Analysis Based on Numerical Simulation

Abstract:

This paper studies the related problems which belong to research of digital content platform by using numerical simulation. Results from the research show that: the Nash-equilibrium is not the optimal outcome in the R&D competition. The government should pay attention to the continuity of investment. The larger the conversion rate of the user scale, R&D investment allowance rate and the foresight of companies are, the more the technology stock and consumer welfare are.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 756-759)
• Pages: 4735-4741
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.756-759.4735
• Online since: September 2013
• Authors: Fu Jin Zhang, Jie Shang, Bin Wang
• Keywords: Digital Content Platform, Nash-Equilibrium, Numerical Simulation, R&D

References

[1] Falvey. R., Foster.N. and Greenaway.D. Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth,. Review of Development Economics, 2006, 10, (4): 700-719.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00343.x

[2] Yong Gyu Joo, So Young Sohn. Structural equation model for effective CRM of digital content industry,. Expert Systems with Applications, 2008, (34): 63–71.

DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2006.08.016

[3] Paula M C Swatman, Cornelia Krueger, Kornelia van der Beek. The changing digital content landscape: An evaluation of e-business model development in European online news and music,. Internet Research, 2006: 53-80.

DOI: 10.1108/10662240610642541

[4] Cristina Mussinelli. Digital Generation: Overview of Cultural and Entertainment Content Usage in Italy,. Pub Res Q, 2009, (25): 94–100.

DOI: 10.1007/s12109-009-9112-4

[5] D.O. Choi and J.E. Oh . Efficiency Analysis of the Digital Content Industry in Korea: An Application of Order-m Frontier Model,. Productivity, Efficiency, and Economic Growth in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2009: 299-314.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2072-0_15

[6] Luca Lambertini, Raimondello Orsini. Process and product innovation in a vertically differentiated monopoly,. Economics Letters, 2000, (68): 333-337.

DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00254-8

[7] Pio Baake, Anette Boom. Vertical product differentiation, network externalities, and compatibility decision,. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, (19): 267-284.

DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00029-6

[8] Bing Jing. Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly,. Economics Letters, 2007, (95): 7-13.

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.033

[9] Banerjee, D. S. Lobbying and Commercial Software Piracy. European Journal of Political Economy, 2006, 22, (1): 139-155.

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.03.003

[10] Michael Wolf, Clint Wheelock. Digital content unleashed,. Journal of Digital Asset Management, 2007, 3(5): 247–258.

DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.dam.3650093