Inefficiency of Stackelberg Stochastic Traffic Network with Tax Scheme

Abstract:

Inefficiency upper bounds are explored in stochastic traffic network. Equilibrium flow pattern therein is deduced by a central Stackelberg strategy and tax schemes imposed on each link.. The equivalent variational inequality (VI) for Logit-based stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) model is established and first used to obtain upper bounds on Stackelberg network inefficiency under the assumption of separable, nondecreasing, and convex link time function and of fixed network origin-destination (OD) demand. For typical Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) functions and its affine forms, the upper bounds of their inefficiency are investigated with some meaningful results.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 779-780)
• Pages: 1044-1051
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.779-780.1044
• Online since: September 2013
• Authors: Ming Hua Zeng, Xi Yan Huang, Ni Dong, Xiao Guang Yang
• Keywords: Price of Anarchy, Selfish Routing, Stackelberg Game, Stochastic User Equilibrium, Tax Scheme, Transportation

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