Analysis on Cooperation and Competition Behavior of Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game - The Case Studies of Chinese Creative Industrial Clusters

Abstract:

In recent years, not only the academics pays close attention to the creative industries, but also enterprises and the government keep a watchful eye on it. Cooperation and competition behaviors of enterprises will decide their competitiveness directly, thereby affecting the competitiveness and future direction of our creative industries. In this paper, based on cooperation and competition behavior in creative industrial clusters, we establish symmetric game model between two core enterprises and asymmetric game model between the core enterprise and the adjacent down-stream one by using evolutionary game theory, then analyze its dynamic evolutionary procedure. The result show that the systems evolutionary direction is closely related to players payoff, and influenced by cooperation profit, initial cost of the cooperation, capacity for independent innovation, cooperation successful rate and systems initial status. At last, some suggestions are offered for our government which can provide a theoretical basis for integrating creative industrial clusters.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 798-799)
• Pages: 948-953
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.798-799.948
• Online since: September 2013
• Authors: Jian She Li, Le Wei Yan
• Keywords: Competition Behavior, Cooperation Behaviors, Evolutionary Game, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics Equation

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