The Motivation and Restriction Mechanisms of Emission Trading in the Tai Lake Basin

Lei Qiu; Shuang Zhao; Hui Min Wang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.831.299

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Highway Construction and Ecological Environment Protection: Corn Relationship and Key Principle
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Eco-Engineering Measures for the Sandy Side-Slope Protection of Newly Regulated Rivers in Humid Region
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The Motivation and Restriction Mechanisms of Emission Trading in the Tai Lake Basin
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Estimating the Elastic Settlement of Vertically Loaded Single Piles in Rock
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3D Numerical Analysis of Centrifuge Tests on Embankments on Soft and Stiff Ground
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Experimental Study on the Effects of Wetting-Drying Cycles of Compacted Loess
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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vol. 831The Motivation and Restriction Mechanisms of...

The Motivation and Restriction Mechanisms of Emission Trading in the Tai Lake Basin

Abstract:

This paper offers a Government-Enterprise-Public cooperation mode of emission trading in the Tai Lake Basin based on the governing theory of the common pool resources. Then, the motivation and restriction mechanisms have been designed, that is, a water environmental regulation contract with the effect of incentive and constraint penalty is signed between the water environmental management institute and the enterprises. Further, a principal-agent model is developed, by which a set of results of the water environment regulation optimal contract is obtained. The effects of public participation and local government protection probability on the contract are analyzed. The results show that the increase of public participation could decrease the optimal fine amount, which will weaken the contradictions between the local government and the enterprises, and the decrease of the local government protection probability would reduce the regulatory frequency, correspondingly the supervision cost will be low.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volume 831)

Pages:

299-303

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.831.299

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Online since:

December 2013

Authors:

Lei Qiu*, Shuang Zhao, Hui Min Wang

Keywords:

Emission Trading, Motivation Mechanism, Multi-Agent Cooperation, Restriction Mechanisms, Tai Lake Basin

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