Profit Allocation and Realization in Regional Technology Transfer Alliance Based on Game Theory

Abstract:

Regional technology transfer alliance consists of universities, scientific research institutions, enterprises, governments and technology agencies. Through the behavior game analysis of profit allocation between technology transfer participants, we propose that the profit allocation in regional technology transfer alliance is a consequence of gaming process among the participants. The governments and technology agencies should undertake the technology transfer market value assessment and market regulation to improve a sustained and stable cooperation in technology transfer between the technology supplier and demander. The transfer profit can realize by the ways of lump sum payment or payment by instalments, royalty payment, mixed royalty payment, production investment payment, service investment payment and mixed payment.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 834-836)
• Pages: 2011-2016
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.834-836.2011
• Online since: October 2013
• Authors: Dan Hu*, Jing Dong Yan
• Keywords: Game Theory, Profit Allocation, Profit Realization, Regional Technology Transfer Alliance

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