Modeling of Incentive Interruptible Load Contract for Practical Application

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Abstract:

Interruptible load contract is an important means of demand side management, but its existing models cant coordinate practicality with efficiency. Based on the curtailment cost function of consumers, this paper proposes an optional interruptible load contract and builds an optimal curtailment amount and compensation pricing model by introducing information display and incentive mechanism. The model can guide consumers voluntarily disclose the information on their true cost, and achieve the optimal allocation of load interruption. It is better to coordinate the relationship between utility and economic efficiency, which is more efficient than the traditional practical optional contract for interruptible load, and more practical than the theoretical model of interruptible load contract of fully nonlinear pricing. Numerical examples verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 860-863)

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2434-2440

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December 2013

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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