The Master Production Scheduling Model for Buyer and Vendor Based on Bargaining Game

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Abstract:

Master production scheduling plays an important role in planning levels. The scheduling without coordination will lead to an unsatisfied result. In this paper, the master production scheduling model based on bargaining game between buyer and vendor is established to realize integrated management. The improved solution of Nash equilibrium is achieved by the bargaining game. The simulation results verified the model and algorithms effectiveness.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 860-863)

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3073-3077

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Online since:

December 2013

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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