Applied Technology in Supervision Model of Government Investment Projects Based on Deterrence Game Model

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Abstract:

The psychology of utility of the agent in government investment projects is studied from the psychological point of view in this paper. Combining the game theory with the deterrence theory, we establish the applied technology named deterrence game model which is used to predict the behavioral intention of the agent. Then according to the specific actions of the agent during the construction,we adjust to exert a certain deterrence which is expected to restrain and guide the behavior of the agent,which makes the whole process supervision of government investment projects under control.This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of the applied technology.

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197-201

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May 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320

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