An Equilibrium Analysis of the Rent-Seeking Contests in Infrastructure Construction

Abstract:

A rent-seeking contest model is established to analyse the rent-seeking behaviors in the bidding process of infrastructure constructions. The solution of the model shows that if we want to reduce the phenomena in the bidding process of infrastructure constructions, the punishment efficiency on the bureaucrats must be no less but do not need to be higher than a certain number. So if we want the bureaucrats to reject the rent-seeking behaviors more thoroughly, we must lower the cost for the supervisor to check the contest and increase the bonus for the supervisor to find out the rent-seeking behaviors so as to increase the efficiency of the anti-corruption institution.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 278-280)
• Pages: 2313-2318
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.278-280.2313
• Online since: January 2013
• Authors: Chang Lin Wu, Chang Chen Liu
• Keywords: Equilibrium, Infrastructure Construction, Rent-Seeking Contest

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