Computer Simulation of Enterprises Betrayal & Government Intervention Effects in Iron Ore Price Negotiation

Yun Zhang; Qing He

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.411-414.2330

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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vols. 411-414Computer Simulation of Enterprises Betrayal &...

Computer Simulation of Enterprises Betrayal & Government Intervention Effects in Iron Ore Price Negotiation

Abstract:

This research established an evolutionary game model to analyze international iron ore price negotiations process which the Chinese steel enterprises participated under the rationality assumptions of negotiation parties. We simulated the evolutionary game using the matlab7.10. The results show that the larger betrayal income is, the faster Chinese steel enterprises and foreign iron ore enterprises choose the non-compromise strategy, and the larger penalty or reward which chinese government gives the iron ore enterprise is, the faster the iron ore enterprise chooses the compromise strategy. Moreover, this study proposes some reasonable iron ore negotiation strategies for Chinese government and steel enterprises.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 411-414)

Pages:

2330-2334

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.411-414.2330

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Online since:

September 2013

Authors:

Yun Zhang, Qing He

Keywords:

Computer Simulation, Enterprises Betrayal, Evolutionary Game, Government Intervention, Ironore Price Negotiation

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