The Research of Hiding Technology of Hardware Trojan in Chip

Abstract:

To solve the hiding problem of hardware Trojan in chip, we first analyzed the self-protection technology of malicious software, and then proposed a trigger mechanism that base on timing finite state machine (TFSM), energy flow, and distributed Trojan design method. As for the trigger mechanism that based on TFSM, one must enter the right pattern on the correct time to activate the Trojan. The mechanism based on energy flow can make the hardware Trojan keep hiding in the RTL code logical analysis. The distributed hardware Trojan design is to divide a complete Trojan into several components, and the Trojan will keep silent if all the components are not in order. The design methods of hardware Trojan have been verified in our self-made hardware threat simulate platform, it can reduce the rate of been detected out, and the possibility of been triggered out by random operations.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 446-447)
• Pages: 876-881
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.446-447.876
• Online since: November 2013
• Authors: Xiao Peng Niu, Qing Bao Li, Xiao Dong Xie
• Keywords: Chip, Distributed, Energy, Hardware Trojan, Timing

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