Cooperative Game Analysis on Regional Economic Development and Environmental Governance

Article Preview

Abstract:

This paper analyzes formation conditions of regional economic development and trans-boundary environmental pollution governance cooperation mechanism by building a cooperative game model and numerical calculation. Net utility of local governments is the difference between economic utility and trans-boundary pollution governance cost, and coalition help local government expand the increment of economic utility and conserve loss of environment utility. This paper use Shapley value method to allocate net utility rising from cooperation between local governments. When the utility of local governments participating in cooperation is greater compared to not participating in cooperation, local governments cooperate for regional economic development and environmental governance.

You might also be interested in these eBooks

Info:

Periodical:

Pages:

4184-4187

Citation:

Online since:

October 2013

Authors:

Export:

Price:

Permissions CCC:

Permissions PLS:

Сopyright:

© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Share:

Citation:

* - Corresponding Author

[1] M. Santilli, and P. Moutinho. Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol, Climatic Change, Vol, 71(2005), pp.267-276.

DOI: 10.1007/s10584-005-8074-6

Google Scholar

[2] S.B. Youssef. Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade. The Annals of Regions Science, Vol. 43(2009), pp.235-250.

Google Scholar

[3] H.A. Heijden. Globalization, environmental movements, and international political opportunity structures. Organization & Environment, Vol. 19(2006), pp.28-45.

DOI: 10.1177/1086026605285452

Google Scholar

[4] J.B. Krawczyk. Coupled Constraint Nash Equilibria in Environmental Games. Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 27(2005), pp.157-181.

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2004.08.001

Google Scholar

[5] Xue-mei Jie, and Zhi-peng Zang. Cooperative game of ecological environment safety management in Manufacture industry. Statistics and Decision, No. 1 (2011) pp.37-39(in Chinese).

Google Scholar

[6] Yang Liu, and Yu-qiu Wan. Game analysis on local governments in cross-region environmental regulation. Environmental Protection Science, No. 1 (2010), pp.34-36(in Chinese).

Google Scholar

[7] Hong-gang Liu, Xin-geng Chen, and Xiao-chun Peng. The cooperative environmental game model in Tidal River network regions and its empirical research. Acta Ecologica Sinica, No. 11 (2012), pp.3586-3594(in Chinese).

DOI: 10.5846/stxb201105200663

Google Scholar