Game Analysis of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project

Abstract:

With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains its vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field, for example, construction unit and supervision unit may conspire together to swindle governmental capital. This paper introduces some background which exists in construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes conspiracy game’s utility matrix of construction unit and supervision unit by introducing game theory. By establishing conspiracy game model between construction unit and supervision unit, the paper mainly discusses conspiracy action which may occur between construction unit and supervision unit (rent-seeking and rent-creating), gets equilibrium probabilities of seeking rent and creating rent, and make some further analysis.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 50-51)
• Pages: 409-413
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.50-51.409
• Online since: February 2011
• Authors: Li Chao Feng, Chun Feng Liu, Shao Hong Yan, Ai Min Yang, Jin Peng Wang
• Keywords: Conspiracy, Constriction Project, Equilibrium Probability, Game Theory

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