Incentive Contract Designing of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project

Abstract:

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With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field such as the conspiracy between construction unit and supervision unit. This paper introduces some background of construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes game model between government and supervision unit. Finally, the paper designs governmental incentive contract, and calculates optimal incentive reward which maximize governmental expected utility, which could encourage supervision unit to supervise construction unit by adjusting reward, and decrease probability of conspiracy between supervision unit and construction unit.

Info:

Periodical:

Edited by:

Shaobo Zhong, Yimin Cheng and Xilong Qu

Pages:

414-417

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.50-51.414

Citation:

L. C. Feng et al., "Incentive Contract Designing of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project", Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vols. 50-51, pp. 414-417, 2011

Online since:

February 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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