Incentive Contract Designing of Preventing Conspiracy in Construction Project

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Abstract:

With rapid growth of national economy, infrastructure construction maintains vigorous development, but there are some serious problems in this field such as the conspiracy between construction unit and supervision unit. This paper introduces some background of construction project management system, analyses relation and benefit of project’s tripartite main body, and establishes game model between government and supervision unit. Finally, the paper designs governmental incentive contract, and calculates optimal incentive reward which maximize governmental expected utility, which could encourage supervision unit to supervise construction unit by adjusting reward, and decrease probability of conspiracy between supervision unit and construction unit.

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414-417

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February 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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