Applications of the Network and Computer Technology in the Model Optimization of Multi-Object E-Auctions

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With the development of computer technology and network, e-Auctions are widely applied in the field of engineering technology. How to use the computer technology and network to optimize the models of multi-object e-auctions is a hot topic. Regarding the e-auction as a background, this paper presents many widespread theoretical and applied problems, and summarizes and reviews the main conclusions and progress of existing studies related to the computer technology and network in the e-auctions, and then gives several new research topics to e-auctions. It tries to promote the applications of e-auction theories in real engineering technology problems.

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1211-1214

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September 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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