Study on the Effects of Political Association of Private Listed Corporations in China

Abstract:

This document is based on the rent-seeking theory, the relationship culture, resource dependence theory, social exchange theory and stakeholder theory, and using the empirical data of Chinese private listed corporations in 2011, from this point of view that the political connection enterprises will better fulfill their social responsibility, research the social effects and economic effects of the political association of private listed corporations. Empirical study finding, The scale of employees and level of charitable donations of private listed corporations with political association are significantly higher than that no associated corporations, and the stronger degree of political connection, its employees scale is greater and the level of charitable donations is higher; Corporate performance of private listed corporations with political association better than no Associated Corporations, and the stronger degree of political connection, the corporate performance better. This study has a profound significance on using the advantages of private Corporations' political connections to improve the long-term competitiveness of Corporations .

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 687-691)
• Pages: 4588-4596
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.687-691.4588
• Online since: November 2014
• Authors: Yue Liu*, Yu Mei Ye, Yan Wang
• Keywords: Economic Effect, Political Connections, Private Listed Corporation, Social Effect

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