An Asynchronous Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for the Problem of Emission Reduction

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Abstract:

In dynamic cooperative games, a player may use ‘irrational’ acts to extort additional gains if conditions allow. For the differential game problem occurred in the infinite interval, we propose a new asynchronous irrational behavior proof (AIBP) condition. This condition requires that the later the irrational behaviors appear, i.e., the more time the player participates in cooperation, the higher payoff the player will get. Considering the differential game about the problem of emission reduction among countries, we show that the AIBP condition can make the cooperation last much longer.

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195-200

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February 2017

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© 2017 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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