The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

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Abstract:

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

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2233-2237

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September 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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