The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project

Abstract:

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Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

Info:

Periodical:

Edited by:

Xuejun Zhou

Pages:

2233-2237

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.94-96.2233

Citation:

K. Jiang et al., "The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project", Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vols. 94-96, pp. 2233-2237, 2011

Online since:

September 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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