The Research on Problems of Incentive Mechanism in the Relationship of Agent-Construction System

Xuan Chen; Xi Kang Yan; Jin Zhang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.94-96.2243

Paper Titles

Studies on the Efficiency of the CFG Pile-Net Reinforcement in the Soft Soil Subgrade
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Study on the Smoke Evacuation and Safety-Evaluation of Oversized Shield Machine in Tunnel Drilling
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The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project
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The Application of Physical Planning Theory in Objective Management
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The Research on Problems of Incentive Mechanism in the Relationship of Agent-Construction System
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Post Occupancy Evaluation Study in Hospital Buildings – a Pilot Study
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Research on PMO Construction of Enterprise-Level for the Project General Contractor Enterprise
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Identification and Evaluation of Causes and Effects of Change Orders in Building Construction Projects
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Supplier Selection Based on the Principal Component Analysis
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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vols. 94-96The Research on Problems of Incentive Mechanism in...

The Research on Problems of Incentive Mechanism in the Relationship of Agent-Construction System

Abstract:

In the process of adopting agent-construction system to build the non-operational construction projects invested by government, one of the key links in force is how to motive Agent Company to work positively for saving investment, and how to make them obtain reasonable returns. Applying design method of incentive mechanism related with principal-agent theory in asymmetric information case, the paper not only deeply made research on the allocation problems of cost reduction allocation, but also put forward the reference of determining the distribution coefficient.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 94-96)

Pages:

2243-2247

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.94-96.2243

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Online since:

September 2011

Authors:

Xuan Chen, Xi Kang Yan, Jin Zhang

Keywords:

Asymmetric Information, Cost, Incentive Mechanism, Principal-Agent

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References

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