Risk-Sharing Mechanism Theoretical Research between Bank and Credit Guarantee Institution Cooperation under Asymmetric Information

Xiao Ling Cui; Yun Feng Wang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.204-210.1342

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Risk-Sharing Mechanism Theoretical Research between Bank and Credit Guarantee Institution Cooperation under Asymmetric Information
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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 204-210Risk-Sharing Mechanism Theoretical Research...

Risk-Sharing Mechanism Theoretical Research between Bank and Credit Guarantee Institution Cooperation under Asymmetric Information

Abstract:

It constructs bank and credit guarantee institution cooperation risk-sharing model with expected utility and mathematical optimization method based on risk-sharing theory. It shows that risk-sharing ratio between credit guarantee institution and associated bank is rising with the increase of safety assets return and default repayment rate and the decrease of loan rate of credit guarantee rate, while, amplification of credit guarantee could form inflection with the change of default repayment rate and it is the default recovery rate, guarantee rate, realizable value rate of counter-guarantee measure and loan rate of credit guarantee products positive that effect to amplification of credit guarantee.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 204-210)

Pages:

1342-1345

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.204-210.1342

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Online since:

February 2011

Authors:

Xiao Ling Cui, Yun Feng Wang

Keywords:

Asymmetric Information, Bank and Credit Guarantee Institution Cooperation, Credit Guarantee, Risk-Sharing

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