A Stackelberg Dynamic Game Model for Climate Change

Abstract:

Climate-Change (Global warming) is the central point on the current agenda of the international environmental policy. This paper proposes a model to formulate the global warming policy as dynamic Stackelberg or Leader-Follower Game. In this game, an international agency or international agreement is the leader, who will decide the emission abatement rate of each region; and the followers are several regions who control their consumption of carbon-energy relating to carbon emissions. The challenge of this model is to solve its equilibrium since it is not a liner-quadratic game model.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 204-210)
• Pages: 1720-1723
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.204-210.1720
• Online since: February 2011
• Authors: Xiao Yan Zou
• Keywords: Climate Change, Global Warming, Stackelberg Game

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