A Research on the Internal Control Information’s Disclosure of Signal Game Model of the Listed Companies

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Abstract:

This paper studied the game theory about that the listed companies used internal control disclosure as signal under the condition of incomplete information, constructed a signal game model to analyze the internal control information disclosure problem under the condition of incomplete information. It also proposed some policy Suggestions to inspire the listed companies to disclose internal control message veritably.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 403-408)

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1676-1679

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Online since:

November 2011

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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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DOI: 10.2307/2672910

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