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A Game Model for Adversarial Classification in Spam Filtering
Abstract:
With the wide applications of machine learning techniques in spam filtering, malicious adversaries have been increasingly launching attacks against the filtering systems. In this paper, we model the interaction between the data miner and the adversary as Stackelberg games. Though existing algorithms for Stackelberg games efficiently find optimal solutions, they critically assume the follower plays optimally and rationally. Unfortunately, in real-world applications, because of follower's bounded rationality and limited observation of the leader's strategy, it may deviate from their expected optimal response. Considering this crucial problem, this paper solve for the Nash equilibrium. Experiments on real spam dataset demonstrate that bounded rationality and limited observation can make Stackelberg games more practical and provide interesting insights about the interaction between the data miner and the spammer in spam filtering.
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5053-5057
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Online since:
January 2012
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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved
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