Strategy on Energy Capacity Control

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Abstract:

In the past, energy authorities attempted to prevent potential entrants from participating in the energy market. This study posits that this two-stage game theory is insufficient to describe the modern-day situation. Ware (1984) modified the Dixit (1980) model to develop a three-stage game structure. We use this mathematical model to analyze the optimal cost of an energy authority and the strategy of excess capacity.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 512-515)

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1227-1230

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May 2012

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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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