R&D Investment on Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Insights from a Two-Stage Game Theoretic Model

Chun Jie Chi; Tie Ju Ma

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.544.105

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vol. 544R&D Investment on Alternative Fuel Vehicles:...

R&D Investment on Alternative Fuel Vehicles: Insights from a Two-Stage Game Theoretic Model

Abstract:

The R&D on alternative fuel vehicles has gained increasing attention by companies. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model to explore the cooperative and noncooperative R&D activities in alternative fuel vehicles with spillovers. The results provide practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volume 544)

Pages:

105-109

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.544.105

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Online since:

June 2012

Authors:

Chun Jie Chi, Tie Ju Ma

Keywords:

Alternative Fuel Vehicles, Game Model, R&D

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