Initial Allocation of Emission Rights Difficulties and Solution Strategies

Abstract:

Being as a China's environmental management policy Emissions trading system is an important innovation, it has been adopt for many years, but the initial allocation of emission rights is becoming a constraining bottleneck in the implementation of China's emissions trading depth. In this paper, tracing the initial allocation of emission rights at home and abroad related to the theory and practice based on the analysis of our initial allocation of emission rights by the current difficulties exist. This legislation recognized property rights from the environment. The environmental capacity of the scientific definition, and market-based emissions trading and other dimensions of proposed initial allocation of emission rights to promote a fair, impartial and efficient response to protect its trade measures to promote domestic emissions trading depth provides a new idea.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 550-553)
• Pages: 3413-3419
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.550-553.3413
• Online since: July 2012
• Authors: Yong Zhu, Yun Feng Zou, Yan Hua Zhang
• Keywords: Emission Right, Initial Allocation, Strategy

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