Construction Quality Supervision Game Analysis and Collusion

Abstract:

Driven by benefit and asymmetrical information, collusion behaviors occur between Supervisors and construction enterprises in the process of construction quality supervision. By utilizing the game theory, the tripartite gambling behaviors of the real state development, the quality supervisor and the construction enterprise were analyzed. Based on the three-hierarchy organization analysis, a “request—supervision ~ proxy” model was constructed to inspect collusion and incentive mechanism. Related proposals were put forward．

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volume 569)
• Pages: 723-728
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.569.723
• Online since: September 2012
• Authors: Hong Ren, Fei Xu
• Keywords: Game Analysis, Quality Control, Real Estate Project

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