Technology Spillover and Enterprise Innovation Cooperation in Complementary Products of Different Industrie

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Abstract:

R&D activities have become the embodiment of an enterprise's core competitiveness. Based on the classic AJ model, this paper constructs the expected profit model in the non-cooperation, cooperation and social welfare maximizing conditions, and analyses the behavior effects to R&D and production behavior in the heterogeneous complementary enterprises. Through comparing Nash equilibrium R&D investment and production output, we conclude that R&D behavior plays a positive role on the cooperation between the heterogeneous complementary enterprises.

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Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 694-697)

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3642-3647

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May 2013

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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