Research on Regional Synergy Carbon Reduction Cost Allocation Based on Cooperative Game

Jian Li; Sheng Ren Piao

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.781-784.2569

Paper Titles

Analysis of the Driving Forces' Impact on the Low-Carbon Development of Tianjin Based on STIRPAT Model
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Phase Equilibria and Surface Tensions for MDEA, DEA and their Aqueous Solutions
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Study on the Cooperation Mechanism among Supply Network Enterprises in Low Carbon Economy
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Poly(N,N-Dimethylaminoethyl Methacrylate) Gas Separation Membranes
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Research on Regional Synergy Carbon Reduction Cost Allocation Based on Cooperative Game
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Electrochemical Reduction of Carbon Dioxide in 1-Ethyl-3-Methylimidazolium BF₄/Methanol Electrolyte
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Test and Application of Desulfurization Catalyst
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Analysis of the Causes of High Calcium Carbonate Content in Coal-Fired Power Plant Desulfurization Gypsum
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Influence of Iron Oxides on NO_x Emission in Coke Combustion
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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 781-784Research on Regional Synergy Carbon Reduction Cost...

Research on Regional Synergy Carbon Reduction Cost Allocation Based on Cooperative Game

Abstract:

Regional synergy reduction of carbon emissions is an effective means of reducing the total emission.In order to encourage each region to join reduction mechanism,first of all, we should set a reasonable plan about the cost of cooperative emission reduction.This thesis is based on the way of cooperative game to analysis the cost allocation problem of cooperative reduction in the area of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,and discuss the rational behavior of cooperative reduction in each region. This paper uses Shapley value method to find the solution of the cooperation model, the example shows that the cooperation mechanism is reasonable,so as to verify the feasibility of the regional collaborative carbon emission reduction.And this paper could provide some policy suggestions for regional carbon emission reduction in our country.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 781-784)

Pages:

2569-2572

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.781-784.2569

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Online since:

September 2013

Authors:

Jian Li, Sheng Ren Piao

Keywords:

Cooperative Game, Cost Allocation, Jing-Jin-Ji, Regional Synergy Reduction of Carbon Emissions, Shapley Value

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