A Static Game Study between Food Enterprises Based on Value Perception Differences of Food Quality and Safety

Yuan Fen Yin; Yun Deng; Xiu Li Sang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.791-793.2171

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 791-793A Static Game Study between Food Enterprises Based...

A Static Game Study between Food Enterprises Based on Value Perception Differences of Food Quality and Safety

Abstract:

Behavior strategy of food enterprises exerts a direct influence on food quality and safety. Against the backdrop of value perception differences on food quality and safety between different food enterprises, this paper establishes a static game model and based on prospect theory, explores the reasons for food quality and safety issues in our food market from the perspectives of psychology and economics. Finally, it presents a more scientific food quality and safety mechanism and countermeasures.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 791-793)

Pages:

2171-2174

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.791-793.2171

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Online since:

September 2013

Authors:

Yuan Fen Yin, Yun Deng, Xiu Li Sang

Keywords:

Food Quality, Food Safety, Prospect Theory, Static Game, Value Perception

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