Government Supervision Game for Infrastructure PPP

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Abstract:

The paper analyzed the necessity of PPP governmental supervision game on the basis of existed infrastructure government supervision and analyzed the policy, market and public benefit risk of private sectors, whereupon determined the setup of framework for PPP program government supervision. Supervision will mainly cover the following items: market access; service quality; service price; external supervision; social fairness etc. Lastly, the paper established ethnic risk model of private sector, and came to the following conclusion: degree of ethnic risk is positive correlated with the additional revenue from evil conduct y and market interest rate r, and is negative correlated with the reward from franchised business W, possibility of discovering evil conduct Po, fines derived from punishment of evil conduct D, term of franchised operation t, period of default i and reward declining amount x.

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Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 838-841)

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3142-3146

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November 2013

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1846507

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