Implementation Aware Hardware Trojan Trigger

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Recently, the threat of hardware Trojans has garnered attention. Hardware Trojans are malicious circuits that are incorporated into large-scale integrations (LSIs) during the manufacturing process. When predetermined conditions specified by an attacker are satisfied, the hardware Trojan is triggered and performs subversive activities without the LSI users even being aware of these activities. In previous studies, a hardware Trojan was incorporated into a cryptographic circuit to estimate confidential information. However, Trojan triggers have seldom been studied. The present study develops several new Trojan triggers and each of them is embedded in a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). Subsequently, the ease of detection of each trigger is verified from the standpoint of area.

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482-486

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May 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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