Game Analysis on Profit Distribution between Freight League

Abstract:

With the rapid development of freight industry in our country and foreign logistics giants to enter, freight market is more and more fierce, in order to achieve the power-and-power union, many shipping companies begin to choose to form a union of carriage of goods, and whether cargo transport union will form and form a stable operation is the key of the cargo transport business decisions, based on the enterprise facing this problem, this article uses the method of shapley values proves that the various types of cargo transportation enterprise in the alliance's expected return is greater than the expected return and not joint or part of a joint interest distribution of game analysis model is set up, for the enterprise to form a coalition to provide the theoretical basis of allocation negotiation.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 971-973)
• Pages: 2337-2341
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.971-973.2337
• Online since: June 2014
• Authors: Jian Qing Sun*
• Keywords: Freight League, Game Analysis, Profit Distribution

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