Game Analysis of Bidder Conspiracy Risk in the Large-Scale Government Construction Project

Jian Jun Li

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.971-973.2333

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 971-973Game Analysis of Bidder Conspiracy Risk in the...

Game Analysis of Bidder Conspiracy Risk in the Large-Scale Government Construction Project

Abstract:

Because the corruption occurs sometimes in Government construction projects of China, the paper develops the game model of Bidders and Owners. Then, by analyzing the model, we find that if increased the probability of conspiracy supervised (discovery possibilities) and increased the intensity of punishment, it will reduce the probability of Bidder Conspiracy Risk (CR). The findings are helpful for the China Government to regulate the bidding policies to prevent the corruption risk.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 971-973)

Pages:

2333-2336

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.971-973.2333

Citation:

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Online since:

June 2014

Authors:

Jian Jun Li*

Keywords:

Bidding, Conspiracy, Game, Government, Project, Risk

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* - Corresponding Author

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