Unlinkable Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange

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Abstract:

Affiliation-hiding authenticated key exchange protocol, also called secret handshake, makes two parties from the same organization realize mutual authentication and key agreement via public key certificates without leaking the organization information to any others. Moreover, if the peer involved in the protocol is not from the same group, no any information of the affiliation can be known. In previous secret handshakes protocols, there is a problem which is linkability. That is to say, two activities of the same people can be associated by the attackers. It is not desirable for privacy because the association may deduce it’s affiliation with some other information. In this paper, an unlinkable affiliation-hiding authenticated key exchange protocol is brought out to conquer the linkability. Security analysis is given finally.

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Periodical:

Key Engineering Materials (Volumes 467-469)

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640-644

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February 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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