Research of Resource Matching Algorithm Based on Incentive Mechanism and Penalty Mechanism

Abstract:

Existing incentive mechanisms mainly describe the fuzzy index such as local credit with integer, which can’t avoid distortion of the description. Because Vague set can describe and process fuzzy information very well, this paper uses credit, that is represented by Vague set, to describe the resource nodes’ credibility, and introduces corresponding incentive mechanism and penalty mechanism to update the credit of resource nodes, in order to decrease the vicious nodes’ harm to resource discovery and encourage more good resource nodes to join in the grid. Finally, this paper improves the resource matching algorithm which is based on Vague set with incentive mechanism and penalty mechanism. Simulation test demonstrates that the introduction of incentive mechanism and penalty mechanism increases the resource matching algorithm’s capability of discovering resource obviously.

• Periodical: Key Engineering Materials (Volumes 480-481)
• Pages: 1457-1462
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/KEM.480-481.1457
• Online since: June 2011
• Authors: Yi Hong Lu, Liang Sun, De Cai Huang
• Keywords: Incentive Mechanism, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), Trust, Vague Set

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