Auction Mechanism and Methods for Heterogeneous Goods Such as Multiple Polymer Materials

Article Preview

Abstract:

Multi-object auctions can be divided into homogeneous goods auction and heterogeneous goods auction. In this paper, the auction mechanism and methods for heterogeneous goods such as multiple polymer materials (rubber, plastic, polymer fibre, adhesive, polymer coating) is investigated. Concretely, the research history and the newest research trends are introduced, and many widespread theoretical and applied problems are presented. In addition, assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to heterogeneous goods auction are commented and reviewed.

You have full access to the following eBook

Info:

Periodical:

Pages:

156-160

Citation:

Online since:

September 2012

Authors:

Export:

Share:

Citation:

[1] T. R. Palfrey, Bundling decisions by a multi-product monopolist with incomplete information, Econometrica 51 (1983) 463-484.

DOI: 10.2307/1912001

Google Scholar

[2] J. Levin, An optimal auction for complements. Game and Economic Behavior 18 (1997) 176-192.

Google Scholar

[3] C. Avery and T. Hendershott, Bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000) 483-497.

DOI: 10.1111/1467-937x.00140

Google Scholar

[4] F. S. Hsieh, Combinatorial reverse auction based on revelation of Lagrangian multipliers, Decision Support Systems 48 (2010) 323-330.

DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2009.08.009

Google Scholar

[5] A. Andersson and J. Wilenius, A new analysis of revenue in the combinatorial and simultaneous auction, Working Paper, 2009.

Google Scholar

[6] P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50 (1982) 1089-1122.

DOI: 10.2307/1911865

Google Scholar

[7] K. N. Kannan, Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids, Economics Letters 108 (2010) 49-51.

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.021

Google Scholar

[8] C. Pitchik, Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 928-949.

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.001

Google Scholar

[9] M. Said, Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), in press.

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.010

Google Scholar

[10] R. Bapna, C. Dellarocas and S. Rice, Vertically differentiated simultaneous Vickrey auctions: theory and experimental evidence, Management Science 56 (2010) 1074-1092.

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1176

Google Scholar

[11] J. Bower and D. Bunn, Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 25 (2001) 561-592.

DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00036-1

Google Scholar

[12] K. Abbink, J. Brandts and P. Pezanis-Christou, Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and Spanish designs, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61 (2006) 284-303.

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.12.007

Google Scholar

[13] O. Sade, C. Schnitzlein and J. Zender, Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: an experimental examination, Review of Financial Studies 19 (2006) 195-235.

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhj005

Google Scholar

[14] P. Zhang, Uniform price auctions and fixed price offerings in IPOs: an experimental comparison, Experimental Economics 12 (2009) 202-219.

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-008-9210-8

Google Scholar

[15] D. S. Damianov, J. Oechssler and J. G. Becker, Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply–experimental evidence, Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010) 60-76.

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.008

Google Scholar