Insert Random Time-Delay Defense High Order Side-Channel Attack

Jian Bo Yao; Tao Zhang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AEF.6-7.169

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HomeAdvanced Engineering ForumAdvanced Engineering Forum Vols. 6-7Insert Random Time-Delay Defense High Order...

Insert Random Time-Delay Defense High Order Side-Channel Attack

Abstract:

Side-channel attack is a non destructive physical attacks method. The current cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to higher-order side-channel attack. To defense high order Side-channel attack, in this paper, a new countermeasure based on inserting random delay is proposed to secure AES against higher-order side-channel attack. By inserting a redundant instruction, it is expected to reduce the correlation between the leakage and the inside operations, and thus make the statistic analysis infeasible. The simulation shows the method is efficiency.

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Periodical:

Advanced Engineering Forum (Volumes 6-7)

Pages:

169-174

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AEF.6-7.169

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Online since:

September 2012

Authors:

Jian Bo Yao, Tao Zhang

Keywords:

Advanced Encryption Standard, Cryptographic Chips, Higher-Order Side-Channel Attack, Power Attack, Random Delay

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Creative Commons CC BY 4.0

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