Study on Cooperative Evolution Behaviors in Spatial Public Goods Game Based on Self-Questioning Mechanism

Abstract:

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 380-384)
• Pages: 1783-1787
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.380-384.1783
• Online since: August 2013
• Authors: Rui Xue Feng, Juan Ge
• Keywords: Cooperative Behavior, Self-Questioning, Spatial Public Goods Game

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