Evolutionary Game Analysis on Management of R&D Staff

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At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the R&D staff, between the R&D staff and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes an evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the R&D staff under the assumptions that the enterprises and the R&D staff all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the R&D staff and the enterprises, among the R&D staff, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the R&D staff and the enterprises.

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216-219

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November 2010

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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