The Regulatory Policy Design of Nonpoint Pollution from Agricultural Activities: Issues and Challenges in China

Abstract:

Non-point pollution (NPP) has become a major issue of environmental degradation in China. Uncertainty, moral hazard, and incomplete knowledge of NPPP make conventional policy instruments applied to point source pollution problems difficult addressing NPP problems. NPP regulatory policies should be designed to induce agricultural producers to change their production practices in ways that improve the environmental. The economic literature on NPP has not considered the possible use of both voluntary and mandatory approaches as complementary parts of a policy package. Factors influencing farmers’ cooperative action to conserve environmental public goods are critical in regulatory policy formation in transitional China with huge amount of small subsistence farmers. Under a changed political environment, a joint effort between government and farmers is the approach most favored to address NPP issues, under which relationships between environmental outcomes and agricultural production must be accounted for.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 113-116)
• Pages: 291-295
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.113-116.291
• Online since: June 2010
• Authors: Hong Yun Han, Lian Ge Zhao
• Keywords: Agricultural Activities, Nonpoint Pollution, Regulatory Polices

References

[1] B.A. Babcock, R. Fleming, and D.S. Bundy: The Cost of Regulating Hog Manure Storage Facilities and Land Application Techniques. Center for Agriculture and Rural Development, Iowa State Univ. Publication 97-BP17(1997), Ames, IA, June.

[2] D.J. Bosch, M. Zhu, and E.T. Kornegay: Net Returns from Microbial Phytase When CropApplications of Swine Manure Are Limited by Phosphorus. " Journal of Production Agriculture, 11(2) (1998): 205-213.

DOI: 10.2134/jpa1998.0205

[3] D.J. Bosch, Z.L. Cook, K.O. Fuglie: Voluntary versus Mandatory Agricultural Policies to Protect Water Quality: Adoption of Nitrogen Testing in Nebraska", Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Jan., 1995), pp.13-24.

DOI: 10.2307/1349651

[4] R. Claassen, A. Cattaneo, R. Johansson: Cost-Effective Design of Agri-Environmental Payment Programs: U.S. Experience in Theory and Practice, Paper to be presented at ZEF-CIFOR workshop on payments for environmental services in developed and developing countries, Titisee, Germany, June 16-18, (2005).

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.032

[5] R Coase: The Firm, The Market, and The Law, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London(1988).

[6] W.M. Cochard and A. Xepapadeas, Efficiency of non-point source pollution instruments with externality among polluters: An experimental study", (2002).

[7] A. Dinar, M. Rosegrant, and R. Meinzen-Dick: Water Allocation Mechanisms-Principles and Examples, World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department (2001). Information on http: /www-esd. woprldbank. org.

DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-1779

[8] C. Dion, P. Lanoie, and B. Laplante: Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter? Journal of Regulatory Economics, 13(1998): pp.5-18.

[9] Dou, Z., Galligan, D. T., Ramberg, C. F., Meadows, C., Ferguson, J.D., 2001. A Survey of Dairy Farming in Pennsylvania: Nutrient Management Practices and Implications, J. Dairy Sci. 84: 966-973.

DOI: 10.3168/jds.s0022-0302(01)74555-9

[10] D. Dudgeon: Large-scale Hydrological changes in tropical Asia: prospects for riverine biodiversity", Bioscience, Vol. 50(2000), No. 9, Hyhdrological alternations, pp.793-806.

DOI: 10.1641/0006-3568(2000)050[0793:lshcit]2.0.co;2

[11] R. C Griffin, D. W Bromley: Agricultural Runoff as a Nonpoint Externality: A theoretical development, American Journal of Agricultural Economics(1982), pp.547-552.

DOI: 10.2307/1240648

[12] G.E. Helfand, B.W. House: Regulating Nonpoint Source Pollution under Heterogeneous Conditions, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, No. 4. (Nov., 1995), pp.1024-1032.

DOI: 10.2307/1243825

[13] R.D. Horan: Differences in Social and Public Risk Perceptions and Conflicting Impacts on Point/Nonpoint Trading Ratios, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Nov., 2001), pp.934-941.

DOI: 10.1111/0002-9092.00220

[14] R. D. Horan, J. S. Shortle, and D.G. Abler: Green Payments for Nonpoint Pollution Control，American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. (Dec., 1999), pp.1210-1215.

DOI: 10.2307/1244109

[15] Y. Li, and J.B. Zhang: Agricultural diffuse pollution from fertilisers and pesticides in China", Wat. Sci. Tech. Vol. 39(1999), No. 3, pp.25-32.

[16] G. Meran, and U. Schwalbe: Pollution control and collective penalties, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143: 616-629, (1987).

[17] R.J. Oxoby，J. Spraggon: Increasing Compliance with Ambient Pollution Instruments，Technical Paper No. 05012(2005)，http: /www. iapr. com.

[18] J.L. Pender and J. M. Kerr: Determinants of farmers' indigenous soil and water conservation investments in semi-arid India, Agricultural Economics 19 (1998) 113-125.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.1998.tb00520.x

[19] M.O. Ribaudo, R. D Horan, and M.E. Smith: Economics of Water Quality Protection From Nonpoint Sources: Theory and Practice, Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural Economic Report No. 782(1999).

[20] K. Segerson: Uncertainty and the incentives for nonpoint pollution control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 15: 87-98, (1988).

DOI: 10.1016/0095-0696(88)90030-7

[21] K. Segerson and J.J. Wu: Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2006) 165-184.

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2005.04.007

[22] W.D. Seitz and E.R. Swanson: Economics of Soil Conservation from the Farmer's Perspective, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. (Dec., 1980), pp.1084-1088.

DOI: 10.2307/1240320

[23] J.S. Shortle, R.D. Horan, and D.G. Abler: Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control, Environmental and Resource Economics, (1998).

[24] J. Spraggon: Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards, Journal of Public Economics, 84: 427-456, (2002).

DOI: 10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00088-3

[25] C.G., Turvey: Environmental Quality Constraints and Farm-Level Decision Making, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 73, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. (Dec., 1991), pp.1399-1404.

DOI: 10.2307/1242390

[26] C. A. Vossler, G.L. Poe, W.D. Schulze, and K. Segerson: An Experimental Test of Ambient-Based Mechanisms for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control. Working Paper Series in Environmental & Resource Economics(2003), Cornell University.

[27] G.A.A. Wossink, A.G.J. M Oude Lansink, P.C. Struik: Non-separability and heterogeneity in integrated agronomic-economic analysis of nonpoint-source pollution, Ecological Economics 38 (2001) 345-357.

DOI: 10.1016/s0921-8009(01)00170-7

[28] J.J. Wu: Crop Insurance, Acreage Decisions, and Nonpoint-Source Pollution, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 2. (May, 1999), pp.305-320.

DOI: 10.2307/1244583

[29] J.J. Wu and B.A. Babcock: Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 78, No. 4. (Nov., 1996), pp.935-945.

DOI: 10.2307/1243850

[30] A. Xepapadeas: Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20: 113-26, (1991).

DOI: 10.1016/0095-0696(91)90045-k

[31] S. Zbinden and D.R. Lee: Paying for Environmental Services: An Analysis Of Participation in Costa Rica's PSA Program, World Development Vol. 33, No. 2, pp.255-272, (2005).

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.07.012