Options for the Procurement of Environmental Water Rights-Market Allocation or Government Regulation?

Abstract:

Confronting with the dual task of developing the economy and protecting the environment, China has made environmental protection one of its basic national policies. In the absence of well-defined property rights, disputes over water use have become more frequent, options for the procurement of environmental water rights in China is a pending issue in the process of sustainable development. Due to the public characteristics of environmental goods, the operation of a simple market or the control by government may not allocate water resources efficiently, the government should play a role via public and private programs enhance the environment through the direct acquisition of environment amenities. The estimation of values for preserving environmental assets is more challenging.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 113-116)
• Pages: 296-300
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.113-116.296
• Online since: June 2010
• Authors: Lian Ge Zhao, Hong Yun Han
• Keywords: Environmental Water Rights, Procurement Mechanism

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