Paper Titles

Scale Development of Customers’ Reactions to Other-Customer Misbehavior
p.528

The Influence of Low Frequency Pulse Magnetization on the Performance of Cutter
p.533

Risk Asset Portfolio Choice Models under Three Risk Measures
p.537

Design and Application of an Amphibian Garbage Cleaning Robot
p.541

A Note on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games
p.545

Human Health Safety Risk Assessment of Chinese Construction Industry
p.550

Evaluation of the Capacitances by Using High Frequency Roll-Off Fitting to the Second Order Approximation
p.554

Evaluation of the Dielectric by Measuring Leakage Currents on Self-Built Capacitor-Like Devices
p.558

The Lot-Streaming Flow Scheduling Shops Based on a Hybrid Discrete Harmony Search Algorithm
p.563

HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 204-210A Note on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games

A Note on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games

Article Preview

Abstract:

We provide a general analysis of duopoly game in endogenous timing. The Nash equilibrium outcomes are compared with Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes. The different sets of conditions are provided for yielding respectively simultaneous and sequential plays and these conditions only depend on the monotonicities of the reaction functions and the payoffs functions in rival strategic variables.

You might also be interested in these eBooks

Advanced Research on Industry, Information System and Material Engineering, IISME2011

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 204-210)

Pages:

545-549

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.204-210.545

Citation:

Cite this paper

Online since:

February 2011

Authors:

Xiao Hua Yang, Sheng Li Chen

Keywords:

Endogenous Timing, Nash Equilibrium, Reaction Function, Stackelberg Equilibrium

Export:

RIS, BibTeX

Price:

Permissions CCC:

Request Permissions

Permissions PLS:

Request Permissions

Сopyright:

© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Share:

Citation:

[1] von Stackelberg, H., 1934. Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, Vienna.

[2] Hamilton, J.H., Slutsky, S.M., 1990. Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 2, 29–46.

DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-j

[3] Amir, R., Grilo, I., 1999. Stackelberg versus Cournot competition. Games and Economic Behavior 26, 1– 21.

DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0650

[4] Amir, R., Grilo, I., Jin, J., 1999. Demand-induced endogenous price leadership. International Game Theory Review. 1, 219–240.

DOI: 10.1142/s0219198999000165

[5] Amir, R., Stepanova, A., 2006. Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly. Games and Economic Behavior 55, 1– 20.

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004

[6] van Damme, E., Hurkens, S., 1999. Endogenous Stackelberg leadership. Games Econ. Behav. 28, 105–129.

DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0687

[7] van Damme, E., Hurkens, S., 2004. Endogenous price leadership. Games and Economic Behavior 47, 404–420.

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.003

[8] Amir, M., Amir, R., Jin, J., 2000. Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers. Economic Theory. 15, 297-317.

DOI: 10.1007/s001990050014