Formation Mechanism of Chinese College Debts Based on Dynamic Game

Abstract:

In the last ten years, Chinese colleges have undertaken heavy debts. The formation of college-bank loans is the outcome of dynamic game among the college, the bank and the government. Based on the research of institutional changes about college-bank loans, this paper analyzes the role of institution played at the three-stage from 1999 to now. It is the role of government in this triangle game that determines the development of college-bank debts. Due to the lack of institution supply on colleges’ loans, which should be supplied by the government, the other parties in this game named colleges and banks are set in the plight. At last, Friendly institution should be created for college-bank loans in case of the repeat of that plight.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 268-270)
• Pages: 686-691
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.268-270.686
• Online since: July 2011
• Authors: Hai Shu Qiao, Qin Feng
• Keywords: Dynamic Game, Institutional Changes

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