Evolutionary Game on the Utility Decision of the Duopoly Retailers’ Marketing Objectives

Abstract:

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Firstly, model the evolutionary game dynamical system on the utility decision of the retailers’ marketing objectives in the duopoly situation, individuals in the same retailer group procure goods from the same supplier, and each individuals could select profit strategy or revenue strategy. Secondly, based on standard and spiteful replicator dynamic equation, use new replicator dynamical equation to study whether the equilibrium points are evolutionary stable strategies. Finally, simulate how the proportion of choosing profit strategy changes as time goes. The study shows that if the market scale meets certain constraints and the weight value of decision preference on the profit maximization marketing objective is more than 1/3, the retailer will choose profit as the marketing objective, and vice versa. The probability of the individuals competing with each other within the same group and the demand elastic coefficient don’t influence the result of the evolutionary stable strategies, but influence the evolutionary process of replicator dynamical systems.

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 314-316)

Edited by:

Jian Gao

Pages:

2312-2317

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.314-316.2312

Citation:

R. B. Xiao et al., "Evolutionary Game on the Utility Decision of the Duopoly Retailers’ Marketing Objectives", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 314-316, pp. 2312-2317, 2011

Online since:

August 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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