Study on Post-Bid Market Competition and English Auction for Common Resources

Ying Huang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.361-363.1965

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 361-363Study on Post-Bid Market Competition and English...

Study on Post-Bid Market Competition and English Auction for Common Resources

Abstract:

Based on different post-bid market competition models, this paper studies expected revenue of government in English auction for two common resources usage licenses. Each bidder adjusts their competitors’ cost belief with information revealed in English auction process and decides product quantities in post-bid market if he wins the bid. After calculation and analysis, the following conclusions are reached: English auction would be profitable for government in Cournot and Stackelberg post-bid market competition. Government expected revenue experiences positive relevance with market size and number of bidders in two models. Moreover, government benefits more from Cournot competition in product market rather than Stackelberg competition.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 361-363)

Pages:

1965-1969

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.361-363.1965

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Online since:

October 2011

Authors:

Ying Huang

Keywords:

Common Resources, English Auction, Market Competition

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References

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[6] Information on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cournot_competition

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[7] Information on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stackelberg_competition

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