Study on Post-Bid Market Competition and English Auction for Common Resources

Abstract:

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Based on different post-bid market competition models, this paper studies expected revenue of government in English auction for two common resources usage licenses. Each bidder adjusts their competitors’ cost belief with information revealed in English auction process and decides product quantities in post-bid market if he wins the bid. After calculation and analysis, the following conclusions are reached: English auction would be profitable for government in Cournot and Stackelberg post-bid market competition. Government expected revenue experiences positive relevance with market size and number of bidders in two models. Moreover, government benefits more from Cournot competition in product market rather than Stackelberg competition.

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 361-363)

Edited by:

Qunjie Xu, Honghua Ge and Junxi Zhang

Pages:

1965-1969

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.361-363.1965

Citation:

Y. Huang "Study on Post-Bid Market Competition and English Auction for Common Resources", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 361-363, pp. 1965-1969, 2012

Online since:

October 2011

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$35.00

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